

- 1 -

## FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

~~SECRET~~Date of transcription 12/18/98b6  
b7C

On 12/14/98, [redacted] date of birth [redacted]  
[redacted] for Harvard University  
Faculty of Arts and Sciences Computer Services (FAS), Science  
Center, 1 Oxford Street, Cambridge, MA 02138 [redacted] was  
interviewed at his place of business. [redacted] was advised of the  
nature of the interview and the identity of the interviewing  
agent. He provided the following information:

[redacted]  
[redacted] advised that after  
having the graduate student who is responsible for the systems  
administration of the computer system named jsbach.harvard.edu  
with the IP address of 129.137.41.32, nothing suspicious was

b3  
b6  
b7C

OTHER Sealed Court Documents

There were no suspicious logins or connections  
identified and no indication that the computer system had in fact  
been compromised. [redacted]  
jsbach.harvard.edu is [redacted] yoa, currently at the

[redacted] advised [redacted] that there had been some  
activity on a Chemistry Department computer that appeared to be  
compromised. A report was made by a student stating that the  
student had found a sniffer on the computer that had caught the  
students password. The student notified the FAS department who  
administers jsbach.harvard.edu and her password was changed.  
There were two terminal that were suspected, one being a PC and  
one a Macintosh computer. After a brief investigation, it was  
discovered that the activity was not a compromise, but actually  
generated by a Harvard researcher and student from local dialup  
accounts. The researcher and student were working with the  
Dudley Hirschbach Group.

b6  
b7Cb3  
b6  
b7C

OTHER Sealed Court Documents

Investigation on 12/14/98 at Cambridge, MAFile # 288-CI-68562-46

Date dictated

by SA [redacted]

*288-CI-68562-46*SEARCHED INDEXED  
SERIALIZED FILED

DEC 21 1998

b6  
b7C

~~SECRET~~

288-CI-68562

Continuation of FD-302 of [redacted], On 12/14/98, Page 3

sensitive. [redacted] stated that there was information on the computer system that would be sensitive to the users. Lastly, [redacted] gave an open invitation for any FBI employee interested in looking at the computer system to come to Harvard University and do so.

b6  
b7C

[redacted] advised that [redacted] employs "TCP" wrappers on jsbach.harvard.edu to restrict logins. It is possible that an older user might have been able to gain access to the system through an old account and password in existence prior to [redacted] taking over the system administration for this computer system. [redacted] stated that this was highly unlikely. [redacted] also stated that it was possible that an existing user could have manipulated the computer system but again this was highly unlikely.

[redacted] stated that neither he nor [redacted] could find any sign that the computer system had been compromised. [redacted] also advised that if there were still suspicions that the Harvard staff had missed anything or if the case agent desired, [redacted] would contact his Unix specialist who could conduct extensive research into the jsbach.harvard.edu computer to attempt to identify any intrusions. At the time of the interview, [redacted] stated that he had no justification to request this type of manpower and time expenditure unless a specific compromised account could be identified or the examination was specifically requested by the FBI.

b6  
b7C

According to [redacted] any activity that had been identified as suspicious, has been traced back to legitimate or explainable sources. [redacted]

b3  
b6  
b7C

OTHER Sealed Court Documents [redacted]